Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1998

State of Utah v. James Deiter : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Candace S. Bridgess; Attorney for Appellant.
Kenneth A. Bronston; Jan Graham; Roger f. Baron; Attorneys for Appellee.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, State of Utah v. Deiter, No. 980162 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1998).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/1449

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

BRIEF

STATE OF UTAH

UTAH
DOCUMENT
KFU
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
A10
:
DOCKET NO

Plaintiff/Appellee,

JAMES HARVEY DEITER,
Defendant/Appellant.

:

Case No. 980162-CA

:

Priority No. 2

~S£^2=

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
APPEAL FROM CONVICTION FOR CRIMINAL SOLICITATION, A
FIRST DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN.
§76-4-203 (1995), IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN
AND FOR BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE
HONORABLE BEN H. HADFIELD, PRESIDING.
CANDACE S. BRIDGESS
Box Elder Public Defender
795 East 24th Street
Ogden, Utah 84401
Attorney for Appellant

KENNETH A. BRONSTON (4470)
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM (1231)
Attorney General
Heber M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South, 6th Fl.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 366-1080
ROGER F. BARON
Deputy Box Elder County Attorney
45 North First East
Brigham City, Utah 84302
Attorneys for Appellee

ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION NOT REQUESTED

FILED

Utah Court of Anneals

MAY 17 1Barf
Julia D'Alesandro
Clerk of the Court

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff/Appellee,

JAMES HARVEY DEITER,

Case No. 980162-CA

Priority No. 2

Defendant/ Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
APPEAL FROM CONVICTION FOR CRIMINAL SOLICITATION, A
FIRST DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN.
§76-4-203 (1995), IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN
AND FOR BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE
HONORABLE BEN H. HADFIELD, PRESIDING.
C AND ACE S. BRIDGESS
Box Elder Public Defender
795 East 24th Street
Ogden, Utah 84401
Attorney for Appellant

KENNETH A. BRONSTON (4470)
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM (1231)
Attorney General
Heber M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South, 6th Fl.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 366-1080
ROGER F. BARON
Deputy Box Elder County Attorney
45 North First East
Brigham City, Utah 84302
Attorneys for Appellee

ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION NOT REQUESTED

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iii

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF
APPELLATE REVIEW

1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

4

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.
THIS COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO CONSIDER
DEFENDANT'S INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE CLAIM
BECAUSE DEFENDANT HAS SUBSTANTIALLY FAILED
TO MARSHAL EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE JURY'S
VERDICT OF GUILT
II.

10

11

DEFENDANT FAILS TO SHOW THAT HIS COUNSEL
PERFORMED DEFICIENTLY OR THAT ANY ALLEGED
DEFICIENT PERFORMANCE WAS PREJUDICIAL

18

A.

The Standard of Review

19

B.

Defense Counsel Reasonably Chose to Allow Minimal
References to Defendant's Prior Felony Convictions

20

Even if Defense Counsel was Deficient in Allowing Admission
of Defendant's Prior Felony Convictions, there was No
Reasonable Likelihood of a Different Outcome

24

C.

i

II.

THIS COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO REVIEW DEFENDANT'S
CHALLENGE TO THE TRIAL COURT'S ADMISSION OF HIS
PRIOR FELONY CONVICTIONS, WHICH, IN ANY CASE,
WAS HARMLESS
A.

25

Defendant's Multiple Procedural Failures on Appeal
Preclude Appellate Review

25

CONCLUSION

30

ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION NOT REQUESTED

30

ADDENDUM A - Transcript of Admission of Defendant's Prior Felony Conviction

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
FEDERAL CASES
Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2065 (1984)

2, 19, 20

STATE CASES
Hart v. Salt Lake County Commission. 945 P.2d 125 (Utah App. 1997)

2, 26

People v. Breton. 603 N.E.2d 1290 (111. Ct. App. 1992)

16

People v. Cheatham. 658 N.Y.S.2d 84 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997)

16

People v. Lubow. 272 A.2d 331 (N.Y. 1971)

16

People v. Washington. 865 P.2d 145 (Colo. 1994)

17

State v. Banner. 717 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1986)

29

State v. Betha. 957 P.2d 611 (Utah App. 1998)

27

State v. Brown. 771 P.2d 1093 (Utah App. 1989)

30

State v. Brown. 856 P.2d 358 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)

25

State y. Bullock. 791 P.2d 155 (Utah 1989)

2, 23, 26

State v. Casteneda. 642 P.2d 1129 (N.M. 1982)

16

State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993)

26

State v. Ellifritz. 835 P.2d 170 (Utah App. 1992)

19

State v. Herrera. 895 P.2d 359 (Utah 1995)

28

State v. Huggins. 920 P.2d 1195 (Utah App. 1996)

19

iii

State v. Jovanovic. 416 A.2d 961 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1980)

17

State v. Lovell. 758 P.2d 909 (Utah 1988^

19

State v. Medina. 738 P.2d 1021 (Utah 1987)

27

State v. Mincv. 838 P.2d 648 (Utah App.),
cert, denied. 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992)

1, 10, 12

State v. Moore. 802 P.2d 732 (Utah pp. 1990)

12

State v. Pascual. 804 P.2d 553 (Utah App. 1991)

20

State v. Petree. 659 P.2d 443 (Utah 1983),
superseded by rule on other grounds. State v. Walker. 743 P.2d 191
(Utah 1987)

11

State v. Schweitzer. 943 P.2d 649 (Utah App. 1997)

26

State v. Snyder. 860P.2d351 (Utah App. 1993)

1

State v. Snvder. 932 P.2d 120 (Utah App. 1997)

27

State v. Strain. 885 P.2d 810 (Utah App. 1994)

20

State v. Templin. 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990)

19

State v. Tennvson. 850 P.2d 461 (Utah App. 1993)

20

State v. Tucker. 800 P.2d 819 (Utah App. 1990)

24

State v. Wareham. 772 P.2d 960 (Utah 1989)

28

State v. Webb. 790 P.2d 65 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)

25

State v. Wulffenstein. 657 P.2d 289 (Utah 1982),
cert, denied. 460 U.S. 1044, 103 S. Ct. 1443(1983)

19

iv

Varvaro v. State. 772 S.W.2d 140 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988)

17

West Valley City v. Majestic Investment Co.. 818 P.2d 1311
(Utah App. 1991)

12
STATE STATUTES

Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-203 (1995)

1, 3, 12, 15, 16, 17

Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-204 (1995)

4

Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202 (Supp. 1998)

4

Utah Code Ann. §78-2-3(1996)

1

UtahR. App. P. 24

28

Utah R. Evid. 403

21,22,24

Utah R. Evid. 404

28,29

Utah R. Evid. 609

22,23,24,28,29

v

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff/Appellee,

Case No. 980162-CA

v.
JAMES HARVEY DEITER,

Priority No. 2

Defendant/ Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from conviction for criminal solicitation, a first degree felony,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-4-203 (1995), in the First Judicial District Court in
and for Box Elder County, State of Utah, the Honorable Ben H. Hadfield, presiding.
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-3(2)(e)
(1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1. Should the Court consider defendant's claim that there was insufficient
evidence to support the jury's verdict when he failed to marshal the evidence? Failure
to marshal the evidence waives an appellant's right to have his claim of insufficiency
considered on appeal. State v. Mincv. 838 P.2d 648, 652 n.l (Utah App.), certdenied. 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992).

2. Did defendant's trial counsel provide ineffective assistance of counsel by
allowing the admission of defendant's prior criminal convictions? "[W]here the
ineffective assistance claim is first raised on direct appeal, [the reviewing] court can
only determine that the defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel if it can do
so as a matter of law." State v. Snyder. 860 P.2d 351, 354 (Utah App. 1993) (citations
omitted). "Because of the 'distorting effects of hindsight/ appellate review of trial
counsel's performance must be highly deferential in order to prevent the temptation to
second-guess counsel's actions based on a lifeless record." IcL (citing Strickland v.
Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2065 (1984)) (additional citations
omitted).
3. Should this Court consider a challenge on appeal to the trial court's
admission of his prior criminal convictions that trial counsel expressly acquiesced to, is
unsupported by a plain error argument on appeal, and is inadequately briefed? Failure
to contemporaneously object and claim plain error on appeal precludes consideration of
a claim on appeal. Hart v. Salt Lake County Comm'n. 945 P.2d 125, 131 n.3 (Utah
App. 1997); State v. Bullock. 791 P.2d 155, 158-59 (Utah 1989) (refusing to consider
under plain error doctrine trial counsel's conscious refusal to object to evidence not
constituting ineffective assistance of counsel).

2

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-203. Criminal solicitation - Elements.
(1) An actor commits criminal solicitation if with intent that a felony be
committed, he solicits, requests, commands, offers to hire, or importunes
another person to engage in specific conduct that under the circumstances
as the actor believes them to be would be a felony or would cause the
other person to be a party to the commission of a felony.
(2) An actor may be convicted under this section only if the solicitation is
made under circumstances strongly corroborative of the actor's intent that
the offense be committed.
(3) It is not a defense under this section that the person solicited by the
actor:
(a) does not agree to act upon the solicitation;
(b) does not commit an overt act;
(c) does not engage in conduct constituting a substantial step
toward the commission of any offense;
(d) is not criminally responsible for the felony solicited;
(e) was acquitted, was not prosecuted or convicted, or was
convicted of a different offense or of a different type or
degree of offense; or
(f) is immune from prosecution.
(4) It is not a defense under this section that the actor:
(a) belongs to a class of persons that by definition is legally
incapable of committing the offense in an individual
capacity; or
(b) fails to communicate with the person he solicits to
commit an offense, if the intent of the actor's conduct was to
effect the communication.
(5) Nothing in this section prevents an actor who otherwise solicits,
requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids another person to
engage in conduct which constitutes an offense from being prosecuted and
convicted as a party to the offense under Section 76-2-202 if the person
solicited actually commits the offense.

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, James Deiter, was charged with criminal solicitation (R. I).1 A jury
convicted defendant, and the trial court sentenced him to a statutory five-to-life term, to
be served concurrently with his previous term in the Utah State Prison (R. 119-20).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
During January, 1997, Keith Cole ("Cole") was sentenced to fifteen days, to be
served on weekends, in the Box Elder County jail (R. 133:82). There he met defendant,
James Deiter, who was also serving time in Box Elder County jail (R. 133:4, 83).
Sometime during the middle of January, defendant approached Cole, stating that he
wanted Brent Craven, his parole officer, killed (R. 133:85-86, 88). Defendant told Cole
that he hated Craven and that he was an "asshole" (R. 133:86).2 As payment for

1

At trial, the information was amended, specifying the bases for charging
solicitation as a first degree felony: "[T]he defendant solicited, requested, offered to
hire, or importuned one Keith Cole to murder Brent Craven [a Utah parole officer at all
times relevant] while the defendant was confined in a jail, or the defendant promised
remuneration or pecuniary gain for the commission of the murder . . . or the victim
was a parole officer and the proposed homicide was based upon, caused by, or related
to that official position and the defendant knew that the victim held that official
position" (R. 1-2; 133:4-5). Craven's murder, under these circumstances, would have
been a capital offense on three separate grounds. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202
(l)(a), -(g), (k) (Supp. 1998). Hence, solicitation in this case was charged as a first
degree felony. Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-204 (1) (1995) ("Criminal solicitation to
commit a capital felony is a first degree felony.")
2

Cole gave a statement to agents which was admitted in evidence, in which
Cole also reported that defendant considered Craven "a liar and a dope dealer" (Exhibit
#2, R. 68; 134:132-33).
4

murdering Craven, defendant offered Cole the title and keys to his Harley Davidson
motorcycle when he saw Craven's obituary in the newspaper (R. 133:85-86)3. Defendant
also instructed Cole on where to go, how to get a gun from defendant's brother, how to
commit the murder, and suggested that either a .30-30 or .30-06 would be an appropriate
weapon (R. 133:85-88). Specifically, defendant instructed Cole to "sit up on top of the
hill, sit up on the hill with a gun and a silencer on it. As I seen [sic][Craven] walk by a
window or come out to get in his truck then shoot him" (R. 133:85-86).
Cole reported this conversation to Craven (R. 133:86; 134:114). Craven works
for the Department of Corrections and was defendant's parole officer in January, 1997 (R.
134:113).
Agents from the Investigations Bureau of the Department of Corrections of Box
Elder County asked Cole to approach defendant for another conversation (R. 133:87,
113). Wired so that the conversation could be transmitted and recorded, Cole approached
defendant and talked with him about the plan to murder Craven, i.e., how to get to
Craven's house and where he could get a gun (R. 133:87). In response, defendant
instructed Cole to take the Honeyville Road out to Deweyville, en route to which he could
not miss Craven's home, to wit: the only one on the left side of the road, in front of which

3

Defendant's father, Nelson Deiter, testified at trial that he had physical
possession of the title and that the motorcycle was pledged to him as collateral from
defendant (R. 134:176-177). However, the father was not listed as a security holder or
as having any other interest in the title of the motorcycle (R. 134:179).
5

would be a red four wheel drive Nissan or Datsun with pipes and a camper shell (R.
133:87-88, 120-21). Defendant also indicated that his brother would provide the gun,
equipped with a silencer, although defendant had apparently not yet spoken with his
brother (R. 133:87-88, 121-22).4
Kyle Kano, an inmate at the Box Elder County jail in January, 1997, overheard
one of the conversations defendant had with Cole, in which defendant directed Cole to get
a rifle from defendant's brother's house and then go to Craven's house to shoot him (R.
134:3-5). Defendant did most of the talking and Cole just listened-the conversation
seemed serious, without laughter (R. 134:6). Kano also testified that in the two weeks
prior to defendant's conversation with Cole, he heard rumors from several other inmates
in the dorm that defendant wanted to kill Craven (R. 134:10-12).
Agent Mick Spilker's duty was to set up the monitoring equipment in a room
within the jail and monitor it (R. 134:25-26).5 Agent Spilker testified that he listened to
the conversation between Cole and defendant while it was being transmitted and recorded
4

About a week later, Cole spoke with defendant's brother, Andrew Deiter
("Andy"), who denied knowing anything about providing a gun, asserted that both Cole
and defendant were "crazy," and refused to provide a weapon (R. 133:124-25).
5

The audio tape recording of defendant's second conversation, State's exhibit
#5, was admitted into evidence (R. 68; 134:56-57). The parties, supported by the
testimony of Agents Mick Spilker and Teresa Sargent, acknowledged that the recording
was not particularly audible (R. 134:56-57, 67-68, 84, 213, 230-31). However, the
trial judge at sentencing observed that after the trial he met with the jurors, who
informed him that they had listened carefully to the tape recording and asserted that it
fully corroborated everything that the agents claimed had occurred (R. 132:19).
6

(R. 134:27).6 He heard Cole approach the defendant and tell him, "I got it all set up" (R.
134:27-28). When Cole asked defendant for a gun, defendant responded, "All right, I can
do that. All you need to do is get with my brother Andy" (R. 134:28). He also heard
defendant provide the specific directions to Craven's house and state the arrangement for
remunerating Cole with the Harley-Davidson motorcycle as reported by Cole (R. 134:6869). The conversation appeared to Agent Spilker, also, to be serious and lasted about
twenty-five to thirty minutes (R. 134:58, 63).
Agent Ron Benson testified that during the monitored conversation, he walked
back and forth from the room where he observed defendant on the video camera to the
room where he heard on the monitoring equipment defendant speaking to Cole (R.
134:32, 35-36). Benson further testified that he heard defendant give Cole directions to
Craven's home and describe Craven's vehicle, which would be parked in front of the
home, all of which comported with his personal experience of Craven's home (R. 134:33,
40). He also knew from personal experience that there was a hill across from Craven's
home (R. 134:40). Agent Benson was certain that the conversation he heard concerned an
attempt to murder Craven (R. 134:49).

6

Although agent Spilker acknowledged that he could not visually observe the
conversation and could not identify defendant's voice, he noted that Agents Lacey,
Sargent, and Benson, maintained visual contact of the conversation and informed him
during the conversation that "contact is made," i.e., that defendant was then talking to
Cole (R. 134:28-27, 31). Visual contact was established by instructing Cole to stand in
a specific place so that he and defendant would appear on the video (R. 134:29-30).
7

Agent Teresa Sargent ("Sargent"), who headed the investigation, observing
through the television monitor and the listening device, heard defendant converse with
Cole (R. 134:82-83, 98-99). The conversation took place in a room in which there were
other inmates, from whom defendant and Cole separated themselves in order to converse
(R. 134:98-99). She testified that the conversation over the live monitor, by which the
agents listened to the conversation, was much clearer than the recorded conversation (R.
134:84).7
Agent Leo Lacey was responsible for putting the body wire on Cole and
instructing him where to stand within the jail while conversing with defendant (R.
134:106). Agent Lacey, visually and aurally monitoring part of the conversation,
identified defendant as the person who spoke to Cole. He also heard defendant give Cole
specific directions on how to get to Craven's home, which accurately comported with his
own experience (R. 134:106-07).

7

Agent Sargent's notes of her debriefing of Cole following the conversation
were admitted into evidence as State's exhibit #2 (R. 68; 134:83-85). These indicated
that defendant gave Cole additional details about how to find his way to Craven's
house, to wit: on his way to Dewey ville, Cole would pass through Crystal Springs and
that just on the left side of a church he would find Craven's house, in front of which a
"root beer brown panel wagon" would be parked; if Cole was unable to find the house, he
was to ask directions, giving his name as "Michael Myers," if asked (R. 134:215-16).
Agent Sargent's notes also indicated that defendant reiterated his offer to give Cole title
to his Harley-Davidson motorcycle when defendant read Craven's obituary, and that in
response to Cole's inquiry about why defendant wanted Craven shot, defendant replied
that Craven was a liar, a cheat, a dope dealer, and a junkie (R. 134:216-17).
8

Brent Craven confirmed that at the time of the solicitation he was defendant's
parole officer and had supervised him for about three years (R. 134:113).
Armando Solis testified for the defendant. Solis, an inmate in Box Elder County
jail in January 1997, testified that he was present during the first conversation Cole had
with defendant (R. 134:149-51). Solis admitted that he and defendant were saying that it
would be nice to be rid of Craven, who was also his probation officer, but asserted that it
was only joking barracks talk accompanied by laughter and that it was Cole who
approached defendant and offered to get rid of Craven (R. 134:152-158).
Defendant's brother, Andrew Deiter, testified that Cole approached him at his
home for a gun, but he refused to supply one. Deiter also claimed that in telephone
conversations with his brother, defendant never asked him to furnish a weapon to
anybody or indicated a desire to have anybody killed (R. 134:165-70).
Defendant testified that it was Cole who, in their first conversation, responded to
Solis's joking suggestion that it would be nice to be rid of Craven (R. 134:186-87) and
that when Cole offered to get rid of Craven for him defendant refused by stating that "he
wasn't worth the dirt on my back tireM (R. 134:186-88). Regarding the second
conversation, defendant testified that Cole approached him about obtaining a gun, that he
did not know what Cole was talking about but that if he (defendant) needed a gun he
would get it from his brother, that no mention was made of Craven or of killing anyone,
and that he never gave Cole directions to Craven's house (R. 134:191-94).
9

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I
Because the defendant fails to marshal the evidence in support of the jury's
verdict, the Court should not consider his insufficiency of evidence claim. See State v.
Mincv. 838 P.2d 648, 652 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992). Even
considering defendant's claim, the record contains sufficient evidence "strongly
corroborating11 defendant's intent to solicit another to commit murder. Four law
enforcement agents testified to recording and listening with monitoring equipment to
defendant's second detailed request that another inmate murder his parole officer. The
tape was played to the jury and fully corroborated the details and seriousness of
defendant's criminal purpose, as reported not only by the inmate solicited to commit the
murder, but also by the law enforcement agents.
POINT II
Defendant fails to show that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of
counsel. Defense counsel made a reasonable strategic choice to allow brief and minor
references to his prior felony convictions, which arguably could not have been excluded.
Even if counsel was deficient in agreeing to the admission of his prior bad acts, the
outcome would not have been different. At least one prior bad act requiring committal
was before the jury, since defendant was an inmate in the county jail at the time of the
solicitation; references to his convictions were brief; and defense counsel was able to use
10

the convictions to favorably compare defendant to the State's principal witness, who had
thirteen felony convictions. Most importantly, evidence of defendant's guilt, apart from
the challenged convictions, was overwhelming.
POINT III
This Court should decline to review defendant's challenge to the trial court's
admission of his prior felony convictions because defense counsel not only did not object
to the court's admission of those offenses, but rather deliberately acquiesced in the
admission of the prior convictions. Further, defendant has failed to show that his
counsel's acquiescence in the admission of the felonies constituted ineffective assistance
of counsel, has not argued plain error, and has inadequately briefed the real basis of the
trial court's action, instead arguing a ground wholly unrelated to the trial court's action.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THIS COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO CONSIDER DEFENDANT'S
INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE CLAIM BECAUSE DEFENDANT
HAS SUBSTANTIALLY FAILED TO MARSHAL EVIDENCE IN
SUPPORT OF THE JURY'S VERDICT OF GUILT
In order to successfully challenge a jury's verdict the reviewing court must find
that the evidence and inferences based on that evidence so "inconclusive or inherently
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted." State v. Petree. 659 P.2d

11

443, 444 (Utah 1983), superseded bv rule on other grounds. State v. Walker. 743 P.2d
191 (Utah 1987) . In undertaking such review, the appellate court will "view the
evidence, along with the reasonable inferences from it, in the light most favorable to
the verdict." State v. Moore. 802 P.2d 732, 738 (Utah pp. 1990) (citation omitted).
"[S]o long as some evidence and reasonable inferences support the jury's findings, [the
reviewing court] will not disturb them." IJL (citing State v. Booker. 709 P.2d 342,
345 (Utah 1985)).
To meet this burden, a defendant must marshal all the evidence in support of the
verdict and then demonstrate that even viewing it in the light most favorable to the
verdict, the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict. Failure to so marshal the
evidence waives an appellant's right to have his claim of insufficiency considered on
appeal. Mincv. 838 P.2d at 652 (Utah App. 1992) (citing Moore. 802 P.2d at 738-39);
West Vallev Citv v. Majestic Inv. Co.. 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991)
(adequate marshaling requires "every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial
which supports the very findings the appellant resists").
Defendant first asserts that there was insufficient evidence that he "solicited"
Cole to murder Brent Craven, his parole officer. Br. of App. at 8.8 In support of his
8

Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-203(1) (1995), provides:
An actor commits criminal solicitation if with intent that a felony
be committed, he solicits, requests, commands, offers to hire, or
importunes another person to engage in specific conduct that under the
circumstances as the actor believes them to be would be a felony or would
12

claim, defendant states only that the State's evidence showed that (1) in his first
meeting defendant allegedly requested Cole murder Craven in return for a HarleyDavidson motorcycle, but that the "solicitation" was only "jokingly" made, and (2)
agents listening to the monitored conversation heard defendant ask Cole to murder
Craven, provide Cole with directions to Craven's house, and discuss how Cole could
obtain a gun from defendant's brother's and, thereafter, the motorcycle. Br. of App.
at 8. While it is patent that even this sketch of the State's evidence is sufficient to
prove "solicitation," defendant not only failed to marshal this same class evidence with
the same persuasive specificity with which it was presented at trial (highlighted), but
also omitted crucial facts (highlighted):
(1) Cole testified:
- Having expressed extreme dislike for Craven, defendant approached
Cole in an effort to solicit him to murder Craven (R. 133:85-88);
- Defendant gave Cole detailed instructions on how to find Craven's
house, how to obtain a gun, and where to position himself in order
to murder Craven (R. 133:85-88);
- Defendant told Cole that as soon as he saw Craven's obituary in the
paper he would give Cole the title and keys to his Harley-Davidson
motorcycle (R. 133:86);
- Defendant specifically described the weapon which would be
appropriate for the murder (R. 133:87).

cause the other person to be a party to the commission of a felony.
13

(2) Kano testified:
- He overheard defendant direct Cole to get a gun from defendant's
brother's house and then go to Craven's house and shoot
him (R. 134:3-5);
- During the conversation, defendant did most of the talking and Cole
just listened-the conversation seemed serious, without
laughter (R. 134:6);
- He heard rumors in the dorm from other inmates during several weeks
prior to defendant's conversation that defendant wanted to kill
Craven (R. 134:10-11).
(3) Agent Spilker testified:
- He heard, through the listening device, Cole tell defendant that he had it
"all set up" and stated that he needed a gun to which defendant
answered "All right, I can do that. All you need to do is get with
my brother Andy" (R. 134:28);
- He also heard defendant provide specific directions to Craven's house
and state the arrangement for rewarding Cole with his
motorcycle (R. 134:68-69);
- The conversation appeared serious to him (R. 134:58).
(4) Agent Benson testified:
- He heard, through the listening device, defendant give Cole specific,
accurate directions to Craven's home, further identified
by specific vehicles which would be located
outside the residence (R. 134:33, 40);
- He heard defendant accurately describe the hill by Craven's home
(R. 134:40);
- He was certain that the conversation concerned an attempt to murder
Craven (R. 134:49).
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(5) Agent Lacy testified:
- He heard, through the listening device, defendant give accurate
instructions to Craven's home (R. 134:106-07).
(6) Agent Sargent's notes made in debriefing Cole immediately after his
conversation with defendant (admitted as State's, Exhibit #2) described
in detail the directions defendant gave Cole to reach Craven's house, the
offer to reward Cole with the motorcycle after Craven was shot, and the
basis for defendant's wanting Craven shot (R. 134:68; 134:83-85,
215-17).
(7) The audio tape recording of defendant's conversation with Cole
(admitted as State's Exhibit if5) was played to the jury and confirmed
everything the agents claimed they heard on the monitor (R. 68; 132:19;
134:56-57, 182).
The foregoing evidence is plainly sufficient to support the jury determination that
defendant "solicited" Cole to murder Craven.
Defendant also argues that because he did not "make some effort to initiate his
plan," i.e., Cole was unable to obtain a gun from his brother, Andy, who appeared
entirely ignorant and dismayed by a plan to kill anybody, the State failed to prove the
existence of circumstances that "strongly corroborated" the defendant's intent to solicit
Craven's murder. Br. App. 9.9 However, although defendant appears to acknowledge
that proof of criminal solicitation does not require a showing of an overt act or a
substantial step towards the commission of the offense, or that the solicited act was not
completed, see Br. of App. at 10, defendant's argument belies his acknowledgment.
9

Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-203(2) (1995) provides: "An actor may be convicted
under this section only if the solicitation is made under circumstances strongly
corroborative of the actor's intent that the offense be committed."
15

Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-203(3) (1995), provides, in pertinent part:
(3) It is not a defense under this section that the person solicited by the
actor:
(a) does not agree to act upon the solicitation;
(b) does not commit an overt act;
(c) does not engage in conduct constituting a substantial step
toward the commission of any offense[.]
Further, the general rule is that solicitation is accomplished even when there is
no further action by any party to the solicitation. "The crime of solicitation is complete
when the communication is made with the intent that the other person engage in the
unlawful conduct. It is not necessary for the People to prove that any overt steps were
taken to effectuate the underlying crimes." People v. Cheatham. 658 N.Y.S. 2d 84, 85
(N.Y. App. Div. 1997). See also People v. Lubow. 272 A.2d 331, 332 (N.Y. 1971)
(the gravamen of criminal solicitation is the communication to another to engage in
unlawful activity, without the requirement that anything further be done); State v.
Casteneda, 642 P.2d 1129, 1138 (N.M. 1982) (same, and noting "[t]he thrust of the
[solicitation] statute is not only prevention of the harm that would result should the
inducements prove successful, but also protection of citizens from exposure to
inducements to commit or join in the commission of felonies."); People v. Breton. 603
N.E.2d 1290, 1295 (111. Ct. App. 1992) (distinguishing conspiracy, which requires an
agreement and an overt act, from solicitation, which "involves an attempt to persuade
another to commit a crime").
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Further, although no Utah case has interpreted the scope of the term "strongly
corroborative," other states, applying statutes having the same operative language as
section 76-4-203(2), have found evidence sufficient to support a solicitation conviction
where the defendant undertook no greater preparation than defendant in this case.
See People v. Washington. 865 P.2d 145, 148-49 (Colo. 1994) (under Colorado's
criminal solicitation statute requiring "circumstances strongly corroborative of []
intent," the defendant's offer to sell crack cocaine to undercover police officer, giving
of his phone number and street name to undercover officer for the purpose of
conducting drug transactions, telling undercover officer that he previously distributed
drugs for a major gang, and telling undercover officer to call him in order to execute
proposed drug deal held to "amply corroborate[] the defendant's stated intent to induce
[undercover officer] to purchase crack cocaine from him"); Varvaro v. State. 772
S.W.2d 140, 143-44 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (under Texas criminal solicitation statute
requiring "circumstances strongly corroborative of both the solicitation itself and the
actor's intent the other person act on the solicitation," tape recording of oral solicitation
to commit murder played for jury and admitted into evidence alone provided sufficient
corroboration); State v. Jovanovic. 416 A.2d 961, 964-65 (NJ. Super. Ct. 1980)
(where elements of attempt embraced solicitation to commit arson and required "that
the substantial steps taken must be strongly corroborative of defendant's criminal
purpose," defendant's pointing out to undercover detective the type of construction and
17

layout of the building and assuring detective that the tenants would be safe, even though
the defendant was arrested before he obtained insurance on the building or made
payment to the detective, held to be sufficiently corroborative).
Defendant fully accomplished criminal solicitation when he approached Cole and
offered him his Harley Davidson as payment for murdering Craven. As outlined
above, the record evidence amply depicts circumstances strongly corroborative of
defendant's intent to solicit Cole to murder Craven. The assertion that defendant's
brother did not know of the gun or that defendant did not contact his brother about the
gun is irrelevant. In sum, because defendant failed to marshal the evidence abundantly
supporting the jury's verdict, this Court should decline to consider his claim that the
evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for criminal solicitation.
POINT II
DEFENDANT FAILS TO SHOW THAT HIS COUNSEL
PERFORMED DEFICIENTLY OR THAT ANY ALLEGED
DEFICIENT PERFORMANCE WAS PREJUDICIAL
Defendant claims that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by not
objecting to the admission of his felony convictions. Br. of App. at 11. However,
because defendant fails to show that his counsel's acquiescence in the cursory reference
to the felonies constituted deficient performance or was prejudicial, his claim fails.10
10

Defendant also argues that his counsel was ineffective in failing to procure in
discovery a tape recording of Cole's attempt to obtain a gun from his brother, Andrew
Deiter. Br. of App. at 11-12. The Court need not consider this claim. Defendant
18

A.

The Standard of Review.

In order to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must
show that counsel's performance was deficient by identifying specific acts or omissions
which, under the circumstances of the particular case, demonstrate that ,,v counsel's
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.'" State v. Templin.
805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990) (quoting Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 688,
104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984)). Second, defendant must establish the prejudice prong
by "affirmatively show[ing] that a reasonable probability exists that except for
ineffective counsel, the result would have been different." State v. LovelL 758 P.2d
909, 913 (Utah 1988). "Defendant has the burden of demonstrating that counsel's
'performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment,'
and that counsel's actions were not conscious trial strategy." State v. Ellifritz, 835
P.2d 170, 174 (Utah App. 1992)(citation omitted).

provides no citation to the record indicating the existence or content of the alleged tape,
the record does indicate that there is such a tape, and no such tape has been made part
of the record on appeal. Thus, at the very least, defendant cannot show that he was
prejudiced by his counsel's failure to obtain the phantom tape. See State v. Huggins.
920 P.2d 1195, 1199 (Utah App. 1996) (defendant bears the burden of affirmatively
show[ing] that a reasonable probability exists that except for ineffective counsel, the
result would have been different). See also "When a defendant predicates error to [an
appellate court], he has the duty and responsibility of supporting such allegation by an
adequate record." State v. Wulffenstein. 657 P.2d 289, 293 (Utah 1982), cert, denied.
460 U.S. 1044, 103 S. Ct. 1443 (1983).
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Defendant's burden is heavy:
In proving the first prong of the Strickland test, the
defendant must point to specific instances in the record
where counsel's assistance was inadequate. Strickland, 466
U.S. at 690, 104 S. Ct. at 2066. In so doing, the defendant
must overcome "a strong presumption that counsel's conduct
falls within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance," Id, at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065. "This court will
not second-guess trial counsel's legitimate strategic choices,
however flawed those choices might appear in retrospect."
fState v.1 Tennvson. 850 P.2d [461], 465 [(Utah App.
1993)] (citing Strickland. 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at
2065; State v. PascuaL 804 P.2d 553, 556 (Utah App.
1991)).
State v. Strain. 885 P.2d 810, 814 (Utah App. 1994). See Tennyson. 850 P.2d at 468
(noting that given Strickland's strong presumption of competence, "we need only
articulate some plausible strategic explanation for counsel's behavior").
B.

Defense Counsel Reasonably Chose to Allow Minimal
References to Defendant's Prior Felony Convictions,

Defense counsel impeached inmates testifying for the State with their felony
convictions. In cross examining Kano, he immediately focused on the inmate's two
forgery convictions and robbery conviction, eliciting that Kano was then in jail as a
result of those convictions (R. 134:7-9). In examining Cole, the State's principal
witness, defense counsel was able to develop, at length, the details of Cole's nine
forgery convictions, two robbery convictions and a burglary conviction, that all of the
crimes involved dishonesty and moral turpitude, that he had served time in prison as a
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result of his prior convictions, that he had not been entirely rehabilitated, that at time of
this incident he was serving time on one of the forgery convictions, and that as a result
of his disclosure of defendant's alleged solicitation he had apparently been relieved of
the remainder of his fifteen day sentence (R. 133: 91-97).
At the close of the State's case, the prosecutor asked that if defendant testified
that he be allowed to elicit only that defendant had been convicted of certain felonies,
without further discussion (R. 134:140). The rationale for this request was that, in
view of defense counsel's lengthy exposition of the State's witnesses' felony records,
the jury would be somewhat confused if defendant's felonies were not also mentioned
(R. 134:140). Although not stated, the implicit basis of this request was that because
the State's inmate witnesses had been substantially impeached on their prior felonies,
the State should be entitled to make at least minimal reference to defendant's prior
felonies. Implicit also was that any prejudice connected with these references was
mitigated by the obvious fact that, since defendant was in jail at the time he solicited
Cole to murder Craven, defendant had already been convicted and committed of at least
one offense when he approached Cole.
Defense counsel responded to the prosecutor's request, saying, "I think he's
entitled to that." At the same time, counsel alerted the court that the admission of
defendant's prior bad acts was potentially prejudicial in a way not applicable to
witnesses under rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence, and that the prosecution should not
21

be allowed to delve into defendant's prior felonies to the same extent he had with the
State's witnesses (R. 134:141). The trial court agreed, and the prosecutor asserted that
he would only identify the convictions and their degree (R. 134:141).n The apparent
basis of the trial court's acquiescence in the parties' agreement to allow admission of
defendant's prior felonies was that the admission was obviously some kind of quid pro
quo for defendant's lengthy impeachment of the State's witnesses, i.e. effectively a
ruling bearing on witness credibility under rule 609, Utah Rules of Evidence.12
As soon as defendant took the stand, defense counsel had defendant acknowledge
his felony convictions for evading a police officer, possession of a firearm by a
restricted person, and possession of a dangerous weapon, to wit: a bow and arrow, by a
restricted person (R. 134:183). On cross examination, the prosecutor elicited that the
evasion conviction was entered in 1991, that the possession of dangerous weapons

11

The parties' discussion and the court's ruling are attached at Addendum A.

12

Rule 609, Utah Rules of Evidence, provides, in part:
(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness,
(1) evidence that a witness other than the accused has been convicted of a
crime shall be admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime was punishable
by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under
which the witness was convicted, and evidence that an accused has been
convicted of such a crime shall be admitted if the court determines that
the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial
effect to the accused; and
(2) evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall be
admitted if it involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the
punishment.
22

convictions were entered at the end of 1996, and that a conviction for assault by a
prisoner was entered in January, 1992 (R. 134:198-99).
In these circumstances it is reasonable to assume that defense counsel believed
that if he objected to the prosecutor's modest proposal to only minimally refer to
defendant's prior felonies, he might then have been faced with a more substantial
challenge, to wit: that defendant's prior convictions should be admitted to impeach his
credibility under rule 609 (a)(1). Ct State v. Bullock. 791 P.2d 155, 159 (Utah 1989)
(reasonable trial strategy to refrain from attempting to exclude arguably inadmissible
child testimony, but which counsel could reasonably conclude would be admitted).
Indeed, there is some evidence that defense counsel's modest concession evoked a
similar response from the prosecutor, when shortly afterward the prosecutor abandoned
his objection that there was improper foundation for defendant's asserting that Cole had
actually gone to defendant's brother's house to obtain a gun (R. 134:167-68).
Moreover, it is reasonable that defense counsel recognized that, since the jury already
must have recognized that defendant had been convicted of some crime, reference to
other criminal acts not involving dishonesty would not be very damaging and would
provide a basis for favorably comparing him with the State's principal witnesses, who
had been repeatedly convicted of crimes involving dishonesty. Indeed, counsel
employed this tactic in closing (R. 134:240).
Finally, defense counsel expressly affirmed the State's entitlement to minimally
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reference the prior convictions, cautioned the trial court that the prosecutor could not
delve into defendant's convictions to the same extent that defense counsel had with the
State's inmate witnesses, and alerted the trial court to danger of prejudice under rule
403, if the prosecution referred more than minimally to his prior conviction (R.
134:141). These considerations strongly indicate that counsel was also aware of the
relevant case law pertaining to rule 609, which was the apparent basis for the trial
court's agreeing to admit defendant's prior convictions. See State v. Tucker. 800 P.2d
819, 822 (Utah App. 1990) ("[Generally, a rule 609(a) inquiry should be limited to the
nature of the crime, the date of the conviction and the punishment."). Thus, it is plain
that defense counsel's acquiescence in the admission of defendant's prior felonies was
conscious and not the result of neglect or inadvertence.
Cm

Even if Defense Counsel was Deficient in Allowing Admission
of Defendant's Prior Felony Convictions, there was No
Reasonable Likelihood of a Different Outcome,

However, even if defense counsel was deficient in agreeing to admit defendant's
prior felony convictions, defendant has failed to show that, absent this deficient
performance the trial result would have been different. First, defendant's incarceration
at the time of his solicitation was notice to the jury that defendant was guilty of some
prior bad act, thus mitigating any prejudice associated with minimal reference to
defendant's other convictions. Second, defendant's character for dishonesty and
unreliability became evident when, instead of a simple loan, his father testified that in
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order to pay his son's legal bills he took a security interest in the motorcycle
(R. 134:175, 177). Third, the prosecutor's reference to the felonies was minimal (R.
134:198-99) and not referenced in closing argument. Fourth, defense counsel not only
was able to blunt the prosecutor's reference to defendant's convictions by having
defendant immediately acknowledge them, he was also able to affirmatively use them
by arguing in closing that his felony record was trivial compared with Cole's (R.
134:240). Finally, as discussed at Point I, the evidence of defendant's guilt was
overwhelming. In sum, defendant has failed to show that, but for his counsel's alleged
ineffective assistance, the outcome of the trial would have been different.
POINT III
THIS COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO REVIEW DEFENDANT'S
CHALLENGE TO THE TRIAL COURT'S ADMISSION OF HIS
PRIOR FELONY CONVICTIONS, WHICH, IN ANY CASE, WAS
HARMLESS
A.

Defendant's Multiple Procedural Failures on
Appeal Preclude Appellate Review,

"As the Utah appellate courts have reiterated many times, we generally will not
consider an issue, even a constitutional one, which the appellant raises on appeal for the
first time." State v. Webb. 790 P.2d 65, 77 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)). "The purpose of
requiring a properly presented objection is to 'put[] the judge on notice of the asserted
error and allow the opportunity for correction at that time in the course of the
proceeding.'" State v. Brown. 856 P.2d 358, 359 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (citations
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omitted). "[The contemporaneous objection] rule applies unless defendant can on
appeal establish plain error or the existence of exceptional circumstances to excuse
defendant's failure to preserve the issue at the trial court level." State v. Schweitzer.
943 P.2d 649, 654 n.3 (Utah App. 1997). However, where the appellant "makes no
effort to meet the requirements of the plain error exception by showing (1) an error
exists, (2) the error should have been obvious to the trial court, and (3) the error is
harmful," the appellate court will decline to address the appellant's claim. Hart v. Salt
Lake County Comm'n, 945 P.2d 125, 131 n.3 (Utah App. 1997) (citing State v. Irwin.
924 P.2d 5, 7 (Utah App. 1996), cert, denied. 931 P.2d 146 (Utah 1997)). See State v.
Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1209 (Utah 1993) ("If any one of these requirements is not met,
plain error is not established."). Moreover, the reviewing court will decline to review
a ruling under the plain error doctrine "if a party through counsel has made a conscious
decision to refrain from objecting or has led the trial court into error." Bullock. 791
P.2d at 158. Elaborating on its refusal to consider defendant's plain error argument,
the Bullock court stated:
If the decision [not to object] was conscious and did not amount to
ineffective assistance of counsel, this Court should refuse to consider the
merits of the trial court's ruling. Indeed, the failure to object in such
instances should be treated as a conscious waiver and should preclude
further consideration of the issue.

The plain error rule exists to permit review of trial court rulings as
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a way of protecting a defendant from the harm that can be caused by
less-than-perfect counsel. But the purpose of that rule is in no way
implicated if defense counsel consciously elects to permit evidence to be
admitted as part of a defense strategy rather than through inadvertence or
neglect.
IdL at 159 (citations omitted).
At trial, defendant not only failed to object to the admission of his prior felony
convictions, he also positively affirmed that they should be admitted (R. 134:141), an
obviously conscious trial tactic undertaken neither inadvertently nor neglectfully and
which defendant has failed to show amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. See
State v. Medina. 738 P.2d 1021, 1022-23 (Utah 1987) (refusing to address challenge to
jury instructions defense counsel positively affirmed); State v. Betha. 957 P.2d 611,
617 (Utah App. 1998) (challenging trial court's limited discussion of prior crimes under
rule 609 held to be invited error where the defendant successfully urged the trial court
to impose those limitations). On appeal defendant has not even argued that the trial
court's action was erroneous under the plain error doctrine. Therefore, this Court
should decline to consider defendant's claim on the merits.
Furthermore, tf'[a] reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined
with pertinent authority cited and is not simply a depository in which the appealing
party may dump the burden of argument and research.'" State v. Snyder. 932 P.2d
120, 130 (Utah App. 1997) (citing State v. Bishop. 753 P.2d 439,450 (Utah 1988)).
Utah courts have consistently held that issues not properly briefed should not be
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addressed on appeal. See State v. Wareham. 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989)
(disregarding arguments not adequately supported by legal analysis or authority); State
v. Herrera. 895 P.2d 359, 368 n. 5 (Utah 1995) (refusing to address defendant's state
due process argument where argument entailed only superficial statement concerning
Utah's unique history and reference to another part of defendant's brief). See also Utah.
R. App. P. 24(a)(9) ("The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the
appellant and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented . . . with
citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on.").
As outlined at Point II of this brief, the trial court apparently allowed admission
of defendant's prior felonies under rule 609. It is impossible to construe the State's
request for the admission of defendant's prior felonies, and consequently the court's
acquiescence, as a motion and order under rule 404(b), since the State's request was
plainly related to the impeaching effect of prior convictions, rather than any relevance
those convictions might have in proving some element of the solicitation offense.13
Notwithstanding the trial court's apparent acquiescence in allowing defendant's

13

Compare Utah R. Evid 404(b) ("[EJvidence offered under this rule is
admissible if it is relevant for a non-character purpose and meets the requirements of
rules 402 and 403."), with Utah R. Evid 609(a) ("For the purpose of attacking the
credibility of a witness . . . . " ) (emphasis added). Moreover, it would appear that
defendant's prior felonies, to wit: evading an officer, possession of a dangerous weapon
by a restricted person, and assault by a prisoner, are insufficiently similar to solicitation
to commit murder to be admitted under rule 404(b) to show intent, and the prosecutor
made no attempt to show any similarity (R. 134:140).
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prior felonies to be admitted under rule 609, defendant argues almost exclusively that
the trial court erred under rule 404(b) in admitting his prior felonies. Only at the
conclusion of his argument does he devote a brief paragraph to rule 609. Br. of App.
at 17. There he argues that his prior convictions are also inadmissible under rule 609
because none of them are crimes of dishonesty. However, the prosecution never
asserted, nor did the trial court rule, that any of defendant's prior convictions were
crimes of dishonesty. Rather, the parties acknowledged that they were simply felonies
(R. 134:140-41). See State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325, 1334 (Utah 1986) (all felonies,
including those not involving dishonesty or false statement, are admissible under rule
609(a)(1), if the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect). Thus,
even with respect to rule 609, defendant has argued error on a ground the trial court
never adopted. Moreover, defendant has failed to provide any meaningful analysis or
authority for testing whether his prior offenses were admissible under rule 609.14
In sum, because defendant (1) did not object to the trial court's admission of his
prior felony convictions and has failed to argue that the admission of his prior felonies
14

See Banner. 717 P.2d at 1334 (providing factors to be considered when
balancing the probative value of prior offenses against their prejudicial effect: "the
nature of the crime, as bearing on the character for veracity of the witness; the
recentness or remoteness of the prior conviction; the similarity of the prior crime to the
charged crime, insofar as a close resemblance may lead the jury to punish the accused
as a bad person; the importance of credibility issues in determining the truth in a
prosecution tried without decisive nontestimonial evidence; [and] the importance of the
accused's testimony, as perhaps warranting the exclusion of convictions probative of
the accused's character of veracity.") (citation omitted).
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was plain error, (2) has attacked the admission of his prior convictions on a ground
unrelated to the trial court's ruling, and (3) failed to adequately brief a legal argument
related to the court's actual basis for admitting the prior offenses, this Court should
decline to consider his claim on appeal. Even assuming this Court were to analyze
defendant's claim under the plain error rule and find the trial court had erred in
admitting defendant's prior felony convictions, the error was harmless in light of all the
reasons set out at Point IIC of this brief. See State v. Brown. 771 P.2d 1093, 1095
(Utah App. 1989) (error in admitting evidence under rule 609 harmless where evidence
of guilt was overwhelming).
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing discussion, the State respectfully requests that
defendant's conviction be affirmed.
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION NOT REQUESTED
Because this case presents no complex or novel questions, the State does not
request that it be set for oral argument or that a published opinion be issued.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this XI

day of May, 1999.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

KENNETH A. BRONSTON
Assistant Attorney General
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

1

MR. BARON:

There's one other matter that I would like

2

to address before I rest.

In case Mr. Deiter takes the

3

stand, I have received certified copies of the various

4

crimes that Mr. Deiter has been convicted of here in Utah.

5

We've got illegal possession of a dangerous weapon, two

6

counts.

Assault by a prisoner, one count.

7

THE COURT:

Are those all felonies?

8

MR. BARON:

They are.

9

command of a peace officer.

And failure to stop at the
So we have four felonies that

10

he's had in Utah.

11

saying he's been convicted of four felonies.

12

have at this point is counsel for the defendant has gone to

13

great lengths on my witnesses going over what their

14

felonies were, exactly what they were convicted of and so

15

on.

16

Originally we had talked about just
The problem I

What I propose, I think if I just say convicted

17

of four felonies and leave it at that the jury will say how

18

come they brought up about all of these other people's

19

felonies and nothing about his.

20

Pennsylvania murder one.

21

that.

22

felonies he's been convicted of and go through the same

23

litany, when were you convicted of it and what was it and

24

then leave it at that.

25

wondering.

I won't mention the

I realized we are trying to avoid

I'll just bring these up and ask him how many

Otherwise I think the jury is left
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THE COURT: Counsel.
MR. KNOWLTON:

I think hefs entitled to do that.

THE COURT: All right.

The concern we all had

originally was the poisoning effect of the first
conviction.

If you don't touch that, it sounds like

Mr. Knowlton won't object to the other four.
MR. BARON:

I think the court ruled that to mention

what that is would be improper.

He's got four here. I

don't see that it would hurt to mention those and not the
other one.
MR. KNOWLTON:

You have to remind yourself, Judge,

that this is the defendant, not just a witness.

403

applies in the balance.
THE COURT:

Understood.

And if you don't object it's

resolved.
MR. KNOWLTON:

I'm not sure he's entitled to go into

the same length I did.
THE COURT:

He isn't.

These were witnesses and they

were offenses involving dishonesty, which are a little
different class.
MR. BARON:

I'll just identify them as crimes, when

they occurred and that he was convicted of them and what
degree they were.
THE COURT: All right.
handle it in that manner.

If there's no objection, we'1

Anything else?
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MR. KNOWLTON:

I don't think so.

Have you rested?

MR. BARON:

Not yet, but I was going to.

THE COURT:

We111 have you do that in front of the

jury.

If you would like, I'll give you about a three or

four minute recess and then bring the jury in to start.
MR. KNOWLTON:

I wanted to make a motion to dismiss.

THE COURT:

Maybe we should do that right now.

MR. BARON:

For the record, over the lunch hour I have

reviewed the information that charges the offense.

In

looking at that information and reviewing the witnesses
that have testified and the evidence, the State feels like
for our case in chief we have established the charge and we
would rest.
MR. KNOWLTON:

If it please the court, the State

having rested, the defense would move at this time to
dismiss the information charging the is defendant, James
Deiter, with criminal solicitation, a felony of the first
degree.

We do that based upon the statute, 76-4-203. If

you look at that statute, it kind of comes together with
the scheme with a couple of other things.

That's the

attempt statute and then the criminal conspiracy statute.
If you look at the attempt, for example, you see
the legislative intent there is to say that these offenses
can be prosecuted where there's an attempt to commit an
underlying offense, or there is a substantial step made to
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